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Abstract 
The Kursk, a Russian nuclear‐powered submarine sank in the relatively shallow waters of the 
Barents Sea in August 2000, during a naval exercise. Numerous survivors were reported to be 
awaiting rescue, and within a week, an international rescue party gathered at the scene, which had 
seemingly possessed all that was needed for a successful rescue. Yet they failed to save anybody. 
Drawing on the recollections and daily situational reports of Commodore David Russell, who headed 
the Royal Navy’s rescue mission, and on Robert Moore’s (2002) award-winning book A Time to Die: 
The Kursk Disaster, the paper explores how and why this failure—a multiparty coordination failure—
occurred. The Kursk rescue mission also illustrates a key issue in multiparty risk and disaster 
management, namely that the organizational challenge is to enable multiple actors and subunits with 
competing and often conflicting values and expertise to establish a virtual, well‐aligned organization. 
Organizational structures that can resolve evaluative dissonance, and processes that enable such a 
resolution, have been proposed in various literatures. Attempting to synthesize relevant works on 
pluralistic control and collaborative heterarchies, this paper proposes the foundations of what might 
be called pluralistic risk management, and it examines its conditions of possibility, in light of the lessons 
of the Kursk submarine rescue failure. 
  
                                                          
1 Corresponding author. Email: amikes@hbs.edu 
2 
 
Learning from the Kursk Submarine Rescue Failure: 
the Case for Pluralistic Risk Management 
 
During a military exercise in August 2000, a state-of-the-art Russian nuclear submarine, the Kursk, 
sank in the Barents Sea, triggering global media attention and an international rescue effort. In 
addition to Russia’s Northern Fleet, two other organizations got involved in the rescue operation: the 
UK Submarine Rescue Service and a Norwegian offshore-diving company. Between them, these three 
parties seemingly had all that was needed to rescue the trapped sailors, yet the entire crew was lost. 
How did this happen? In this paper, focusing on the multiparty “virtual organization” formed by 
Russian, British, and Norwegian forces during the Kursk rescue mission, we set out to explore the 
organizational, cultural and structural origins of coordination failure. Then, reflecting on the limited 
ability of traditional, diagnostic risk management controls to address the demands of pluralistic 
situations, we call for the inclusion of pluralistic control principles into the risk-management practices 
of complex, multiparty organizations.  
All too often, we think we can solve risk and crisis-management problems by finding the right 
technical solutions. But because participants in such situations often disagree on the guiding 
principles, there is also a need for leadership to reconcile conflicting values and objectives. The 
organizational issue that the Kursk rescue failure raises is this: how and under what conditions can 
coordination be brought about and engineered (“designed”)? Drawing on the works of organizational 
design researchers, such as Robert Simons’ Levers of Organization Design, the answer is that there are 
indeed several organizational levers that may produce the requisite constellation of resources, 
accountabilities, interactions and mutual commitment. Simons in particular argues that skillful 
managers may adjust certain ‘levers of organization design’, but other management theorists warn us 
about the contingent nature of organizations: there are severe limitations to what agents can achieve 
by design. Thus the oft-cited differences between managers ‘espoused’ versions of how organizations 
and action should unfold, and the troubling divergences, dissonance and actual ‘theories-in-use’ that 
only reveal themselves in action (Argyris, 1995).  
The Kursk rescue mission highlights another issue that often gets in the way of the orderly, top-
down execution of even the best-laid plans: the existence of “multiple evaluative principles”. From an 
organizational design perspective, the co-existence of multiple evaluative principles undermines top-
down, hierarchical structures and  necessitates an alternative organization, an ideal type that David 
Stark calls the “heterarchy”: an organizational form in which units are laterally accountable according 
to diverse principles of evaluation (Stark, 2009).  Heterarchies foster “a sense of dissonance” and 
breed tension – but they are not necessarily dysfunctional. This is because the co-existence of multiple 
value systems can create productive tension, and be the source of innovation (Hutter and Stark, 
forthcoming).  
This raises the question of how to create collaborative heterarchies, that is, how to enable 
organizations consisting of multiple parties with competing and often conflicting values and 
expertise, to orchestrate coordinated action? In the case of the Kursk rescue mission, many 
commentators attributed the apparent tension to politics (assuming the Russian Navy and/or 
Government had no interest in saving those sailors with Western help, having tried and failed by 
themselves). This paper focuses on the less examined organizational aspects of the Kursk rescue 
failure that reveal themselves in two particularly powerful ways: first, in the presence of various 
competing objectives at play, and second, in the conflicting evaluative principles that were in use to 
prioritize them.  
There were sharp, unresolved disagreements on what was at risk, which led to multiple agendas 
coming into play, and the definition of various objects at risk (Boholm and Corvellec, 2011), including 
Russian naval secrets, the Kursk sailors’ lives, the safety of the rescuers, and the political interests and 
reputational considerations of the Russian government and the Northern Fleet. These agendas (and 
objects at risk) shifted in and out of media focus, but were also given different and changing priority 
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by the rescuers and presumably, by key decision makers.  Besides, even when the same risk object 
came into discussion  - the risk to the lives of the trapped sailors-  participants’ assessments of the risk 
in question differed markedly. This can be traced back to the very different evaluative principles and 
expertise applied by the “Western” parties and the Russian navy.  
This is not to say that incompatible principles of evaluation necessarily result in coordination 
failure – the tensions they raise can foster creative debates, with a recognizable beginning and end, 
collective resolution and perhaps even innovation (Simons, 2005; Stark, 2009; Hutter and Stark, 
forthcoming). But organizations that can resolve evaluative dissonance and processes that enable 
such a resolution are hard to find. In principle, their contours have been described in various 
literatures. Attempting to synthesize relevant works on pluralistic control and collaborative 
heterarchies, this paper proposes the foundations of what might be called pluralistic risk management, 
and it examines its conditions of possibility, in light of the lessons of the Kursk submarine rescue 
failure. 
Sources of Evidence 
We draw on Robert Moore’s (2002) award-winning book A Time to Die: The Kursk Disaster, as well 
as on the field reports and personal recollections of one key participant, Commodore David Russell, 
who led the UK rescue effort. Moore was the Moscow correspondent of a British television company 
at the time of the Kursk disaster. He conducted numerous interviews with the Russian, British and 
Norwegian rescue forces, including those in command at the scene, and with the families awaiting 
news at the Vidyaevo Naval base; he later interviewed various other navy personnel, media 
commentators and technical experts. Apart from interviews, he examined extensive archival records, 
including the letters left behind by the trapped sailors inside the Kursk, and the Russian 
Government’s subsequent post mortem and final report that resulted from a two-year inquiry.  
The lapse of almost 14 years since the disaster made interviewing difficult, but we located and 
interviewed one of the witnesses, Commodore Russell, who maintained extensive field diaries 
(“situational reports”) at the time, which both corroborate and enrich Moore’s evidence. We recorded 
and transcribed 6.5 hours of interview material, prepared with Russell between November 2013 and 
February 2014, and also had an off-the-tape, informal conversation with Moore, which gave us a 
better understanding of his research process. 
The following sections outline the incident and the rescue mission in chronological order, focusing 
on distinct elements (the accident, the survivors, the rescue parties and how they attempted at 
forming an organization, and the futile negotiations between them). Our Discussion follows, and we 
close the paper with a call for pluralistic risk management – an inclusion of pluralistic control 
principles into disaster and risk management. 
The Events of the Kursk Rescue Mission 
The Accident 
The Soviet Navy, throughout the 1980s the main opponent of the U.S. Navy and its allies 
(including the Royal Navy), shrank markedly after the fall of the Berlin Wall. By most estimates, the 
Russian Federation Navy of the late 1990s was approximately half the size of the Soviet Navy at its 
peak. The navy’s share of the defense budget declined from 23 per cent in 1993 to 9.2 per cent in 1998.i 
Russia’s new military doctrine emphasized the Navy’s role in securing the economic exploitation of 
Russia’s sovereign seas, but no longer aspired for the “blue water” dominance of the USSR era.ii  
Yet the submarine force was still one leg of Russia’s nuclear triad.2 Russia was a leader in the race 
to construct ever-quieter submarines. Built between 1992 and 1995, the Kursk was one of the largest 
                                                          
2 The term “nuclear triad” refers to a typical arrangement of a nation’s nuclear arsenal: strategic bombers; land-based 
intercontinental ballistic missiles, and submarine-launched ballistic missiles. 
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attack submarines ever built—505 feet (154 meters) long and four stories high. According to Russian 
doctrine, its role in an all-out confrontation with Atlantic allies would be to hunt down and destroy 
American aircraft carriers and battle groups. Apart from the low magnetic signature that made the 
sub difficult to track, its most distinctive feature was its double hull; with over 6.5 feet between the 
two steel hulls, the Kursk could survive a collision or torpedo attack, prompting its designers to 
describe it as unsinkable.iii  
 
Overall, however, the Russian Federation Navy suffered repeated budget cuts and by 2000, the 
condition of its support infrastructure was atrocious. The submarine piers, the torpedo-loading 
cranes, the repair shops, the rescue equipment, the training centers, and the housing all deteriorated 
rapidly.iv In 1995, the Fleet’s annual budget was spent in the first half of the year; payment of salaries 
was then suspended for several months. 
In 2000, Russia’s newly elected president, Vladimir Putin, promised to boost the prestige and 
morale of the military. In order to impress him, the Northern Fleet admirals decided to hold their 
annual summer exercise on a scale not seen since the collapse of the Soviet Union; it involved 30 
surface ships and four submarines.  
As always, the Norwegian Intelligence Service followed the Russian naval exercise. On Saturday 
morning, August 12, the Norwegian seismological institute recorded two massive explosions in the 
Barents, one registering 1.5 on the Richter scale, and the next, two minutes later, registering 3.5. 
Unbeknownst to the Norwegians, a compromised torpedo had exploded inside the Kursk’s torpedo 
room, which then detonated most or all of the remaining warheads. 
The Peter the Great, the Northern Fleet’s flagship, logged a powerful underwater explosion, but 
senior officers, preoccupied with other logistical concerns, took no note. The shockwaves rocked a 
sister submarine, the Karelia, which was carrying out its own exercise orders 32 nautical miles away, 
but its commander and a visiting rear admiral onboard concluded that it must have been an 
underwater explosion linked to the exercise. 
At 11:30 PM, half an hour after the Kursk missed its second routine communication, Admiral 
Viacheslav Popov, Commander-in-Chief of the Northern Fleet, issued an emergency alarm. Just after 
5 AM on Sunday morning, the duty officer in the Navy’s Moscow Command Center called Rear 
Admiral Gennady Verich, the head of the Russian Navy’s search-and-rescue forces, at his home. 
Verich’s first action was to gather a team of staff officers and start planning a response if the loss of 
the Kursk was confirmed. He also decided to fly up to the Northern Fleet’s headquarters in 
Severomorsk and assume direct command of the operation.  
Meanwhile, the scientific director of the Norwegian seismic institute remained puzzled by the 
“mysterious Barents data” and passed the information to the Norwegian Intelligence Service. Many 
analysts were on holiday and it was early Monday when Admiral Einar Skorgen, a commander of the 
Norwegian Navy, got the news. By then, he also had aerial intelligence confirming a concentration of 
Russian warships. Skorgen determined that the Russians were facing some kind of emergency. On a 
direct military-to-military link, he called Admiral Popov and offered “assistance if that is required,” 
but was reassured that “the situation is under control, and we have no need for any assistance.”v 
Inside the Kursk 
The shockwaves destroyed the first five compartments of the Kursk, instantly killing all within, but 
the nuclear bulkhead held. Twenty-three sailors who resided in the aft compartments survived. Two 
hours after the explosions, as the Kursk lay inert on the seabed at 350 feet (100 meters), these sailors 
gathered in the ninth compartment, which contained the escape tower, their one remaining escape 
route (Exhibit 1).  
A 28-year-old captain-lieutenant, Dmitri Kolesnikov, took charge. Taking a notepad and a blue 
pen, he wrote the date—“12.08.2000”—in the top left-hand corner and the time—“13.34”—in the top 
right-hand corner. Then he listed each survivor by name and rank.vi  
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Once the nuclear reactor scrammed and electricity seized, the ambient temperature started to 
drop. The Kursk survivors changed into thick thermal clothing to combat hypothermia. The options 
for them were to wait for rescue by submersible or to attempt an escape via the tower, risking a 
perilous 350-foot ascent and hoping that someone was ready to receive them on the surface. They 
chose to wait. Since the most immediate danger was the build-up of carbon-dioxide in the air, the 
sailors did what they were trained to do, periodically opening up air-regeneration cartridges to hang 
them up and allow the air to circulate through them.vii The chemicals inside would absorb carbon-
dioxide, which the sailors replaced with fresh oxygen by burning candles developed for this purpose. 
However, the oxygen candles themselves posed a fire hazard.  
UKSRS Mobilizes 
On the morning of Monday, August 14, Russia’s main television channel broke its schedule with a 
special announcement on “malfunctions aboard the Kursk” confirming that the submarine was “lying 
on the bed of the Barents sea.” The Northern Fleet Press Service reported: “The crew . . .  is alive and 
communications with them are being maintained . . . using tapping methods.”viii  
The news was immediately broadcast around the world. Commodore David Russell had just 
arrived at his desk in Northwood, London, when his aide told him to turn on the radio, and they 
caught the story. Russell noted the time—8:05—and instinctively, began contingency planning. He 
knew that, to rescue anyone from a sunken submarine, time was of the essence.  
With neither ministerial clearance from London nor a Russian request for assistance, Russell 
ordered the United Kingdom Submarine Rescue Service (UKSRS) to transfer to Scotland and 
identified a suitable vessel in the Barents and a port in Norway where the UKSRS team could join it. 
He also put in an executive order to lease an Antonov cargo plane from a commercial transport firm 
to carry the necessary equipment.  
The Royal Navy possessed one of the most capable mini-subs, the newly refitted LR5, described as 
an “underwater helicopter” because of its maneuverability and versatility. Weighing 21 tons and with 
a crew of two, the LR5 used a “transfer skirt” which could be attached to a submarine’s escape tower, 
allowing hatches to be opened and the trapped sailors to make their way into the LR5’s rescue 
chamber.  
The UKSRS team maintained a database of commercial motor vessels (most serving in the offshore 
petroleum industry) that were suitable to host the LR5 as a mother ship. By outsourcing the mother-
ship operations, UKSRS had the flexibility to use vessels around the world without the overhead of 
maintaining one itself. Russell’s team chose the Normand Pioneer, which was based in northern 
Norway and was in a good position for a dash to the Barents. By Tuesday morning, the UKSRS 
personnel and equipment were all gathered in Prestwick, Scotland, ready for transit to Trondheim, 
the “preferred mobilization port.”  
Russell felt no technical, budgetary, or political constraints to the rescue mission, only the pressure 
to act quickly. First, with an annual budget varying between GBP 500,000 and 1 million ($0.8–1.6 
million), UKSRS was adequately equipped and funded and its personnel was more than adequately 
trained to carry out a rescue mission in the relatively shallow waters of the Barents. Second, while 
politicians at Number 10 were debating whether or not to make an official offer of assistance to 
Russia, Russell was convinced that there was no harm in “stealing a march on events” by putting 
UKSRS into a state of readiness. Third, Russell acted out of a deeply felt conviction that he, as a senior 
naval officer, had sufficient latitude:  
There is a tradition in the Royal Navy of doing what you think is right, taking the initiative, 
and being prepared to justify it later, rather than doing nothing and being unable to justify 
your inaction. The great test is: Can you sleep at night? Hence, to some extent this was an 
example of what Royal Navy senior officers were expected to do—the right thing. I did not feel 
the need to seek orders from the UK. It was sufficient to know that my mission was to rescue 
survivors if I could and help the Russians. Besides, if there isn’t something which literally tells 
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you that you can’t do something, then if you do it, you’re—in theory—not breaking a rule. Of 
course, the flip side to this is that if you got it wrong, it was your head on the block.  
Russell quoted the “law of the sea” as another trigger of his actions:  
All navies, unless at war, have a duty to help one another. This is an unshakable value for 
those who go to sea, even more so for submariners.  
Finally, Russell was convinced that his team was the right team to carry out the mission:  
It felt like my whole life had been a preparation for this moment. It’s because we are 
submariners, we understand what the conditions in the Kursk would be like. We knew that it 
would be freezing cold. We knew there would be water in the compartment. We knew it would 
be pitch-dark. We knew that the atmosphere would be lacking in oxygen and building up in 
carbon-dioxide, the pressure would be increasing, their time was limited. It’s been part of our 
submarine training. So we were the experts, if you like.  
Organizing the International Rescue Effort 
By the end of Monday, August 14, the Norwegian, British, and U.S. governments had offered 
assistance to Russia. That evening, Admiral Kuroyedov, a close ally to President Putin, dampened 
hope of a quick rescue and, discussing the possible reasons for the disaster, alluded to the possibility 
of a “collision.”  
Even though he did not specify what the Kursk could have collided with, his announcement raised 
the political temperature—reviving memories of occasional Russian-NATO submarine collisions—
and drew attention from the immediate concern for the survivors. Due to the undoubtedly intensive 
British and American spy operations off the Kola peninsula during previous decades, the Northern 
Fleet was bound to question the sincerity of any offer of help and, at worst, to regard the offer as a 
cover for further espionage.ix The U.S. gesture was dismissed out of hand as politically unacceptable.x 
However, offers from Norway and the UK, countries with historic and geographic links to Russia, 
were harder to dismiss. The Russian admirals were split down the middle and so were their superiors 
in the Ministry of Defense and the State Duma in Moscow.  
According to the Draft Russian Military Doctrine of 1999, “command and control” of the armed 
forces was exercised by these federal political authorities. By tradition dating back to the tsars, the 
minister of defense normally was a uniformed officer. The State Duma also seated a large number of 
deputies who were active-duty military officers, another tradition dating back to the imperial era.xi 
This tight centralization of decision-making was coupled with a top-down control ethos. Russell, who 
had been privy to Russian naval communications for decades, understood that his Russian 
counterparts had much less latitude in decision making than he did:  
My experiences of watching Russians, listening to their communications, watching their 
exercises and their operations is that they are very careful to observe orders and very careful 
not to take responsibility or demonstrate too much initiative. It’s not encouraged. So there is a 
plan. Everybody has a part in that plan. You do not vary or deviate from it. And if you do, you 
tend to have to ask permission from further up the chain. So quite often you’d hear the phrase, 
“I will have to ask my senior.” Russian officers are trained to follow orders, trained to seek 
approval for what they do, or if there’s a problem, to ask for the answer from above, not to 
necessarily fix it themselves.  
On Tuesday, senior officials in the Defense Ministry were debating whether to accept Western 
help. Many argued that the Western offers were cynical and hypocritical gestures from naval powers 
whose only real interest in the Barents Sea was espionage. The Kursk was the most modern submarine 
in Russia’s arsenal, her missiles and equipment among the most sensitive secrets in the Navy. To the 
older generation of military leaders in Moscow, the idea of losing 118 men aboard the Kursk to protect 
military secrets, while tragic and embarrassing, did not constitute a military disaster. However, a 
younger cadre of naval officers deeply resented the fact that their conservative colleagues appeared to 
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regard saving the lives of the Kursk sailors as a secondary priority. They argued that Russia would 
look callous if it rejected international assistance. There was also uncertainty about which way the 
new president would view the offers of help from aboard. But President Putin was on holiday and 
silent. In Moscow, there was paralysis.xii  
While the politicians in Moscow debated, the Russian submarine rescue team located the Kursk 
and determined its datum (69°36’59”N, 37°34’26”E), making several attempts to dock. On two 
occasions, the pilots managed to attach a rescue mini-sub to the Kursk, but due to short battery lives, 
and to other technical constraints, these efforts remained fruitless. Meanwhile, Northern Fleet officers 
watched the rescue attempts from the bridges of the surrounding battleships, and could not contain 
their frustration. One staff officer shouted at Verich “Admiral, you are a disgrace to your uniform and your 
Navy!”xiii On Tuesday evening the weather turned bad and Admiral Verich had to suspend rescue 
efforts.  
In Moscow, a decision was made to accept Western help. On Wednesday at 2 PM, Admiral Popov 
called his Norwegian counterpart, asking for deep-sea divers. The Russian Navy’s divers operated at 
a maximum depth of 60 meters, but to reach the Kursk, they needed professional divers, equipped 
with the most modern diving and decompression facilities, who had honed their skills in the off-shore 
petroleum industry, and for whom operating at 100 meters was a “walk in the park.” Skorgen knew 
where to find those men and immediately called Stolt Offshore, a commercial contractor 
headquartered in Stavanger, Norway. The Norwegian military treated the rescue mission as its own 
national emergency and, apart from commissioning Stolt to bring its nearest available vessel to the 
accident site, they provided fighter jets for transport, gathered 120 tons of equipment from across 
northern Europe, and mobilized the divers, support teams, translators, and members of the 
Norwegian Radiation Protection Board. By Friday, all were en route to the Barents aboard the motor 
vessel Seaway Eagle.  
Meanwhile, two Russian admirals had met the British Naval Attaché in Moscow on Wednesday, 
requesting information on the rescue technology the Royal Navy could provide. Brazenly 
contradicting the hardline agenda of their more conservative colleagues, the two admirals handed 
over diagrams about the Kursk’s hatch and how to operate it.xiv A few hours later, Russell, who was 
eagerly awaiting a Russian response in London, was invited to participate in a conference call with 
the Russian Military Representative at NATO headquarters in Brussels, where a NATO offer of 
assistance had been extended. In the evening, the Russian government officially accepted the offer. 
Russell, his direct reports from UKSRS, and an interpreter raced to a military airfield near Northwood 
and boarded an RAF aircraft for Murmansk, expecting to join the Russian Navy command. While the 
Normand Pioneer, with the rest of the UKSRS team and equipment aboard, had sailed to the Barents on 
Thursday morning, Russell and his colleagues were refused permission to enter Russian airspace at 
the Norwegian-Russian border. Russell recalled the shock of the moment that, in retrospect, he came 
to see as a “key event”:  
The idea was that we would start to brief the Russians, join in with their operation, and as 
soon as the team on the Normand Pioneer arrived, we could use them. We got to within about 
half an hour, I suppose, of crossing into Russian air space when we were told that we didn’t 
have approval to cross into Russian airspace. So we landed somewhere in Norway. We set up 
communications in a hotel, and then spent a day in fruitless negotiation to move to the Russian 
flagship. Finally, we gave up, and on Friday flew via a Norwegian Army helicopter to join the 
Normand Pioneer. This meant we could never set up a joint command and control structure and 
could not identify a common objective, because the UK team would not be co-located with the 
Russian command. This might have been unrealistic, as international relations were still 
emerging from their Cold War chill, but it was a key indicator that this mission would not be 
easy.  
Russell attributed the refusal to Russian national security concerns, as no British commander had 
ever set foot aboard the Peter the Great. Yet he was determined not to be deterred from his objective—
“to save lives.”  
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Nobody ever had the temerity to suggest to me that I use this mission for intelligence 
gathering, and had they done so I would have told them not to be so silly, or probably used 
slightly stronger words than that actually, because you can’t mix the two things up. If you’re 
there to rescue people, you’re there to rescue people. If you’re there to gather intelligence, 
that’s fine, but don’t go around trying to rescue people. You can’t mix the two things and keep 
both things honest. I would have had no part in intelligence gathering when I was trying to 
rescue people.  
In the end, both the Normand Pioneer and the Seaway Eagle arrived at the scene of the rescue on 
Saturday morning (see Exhibit 2 for a timeline and summary of events during the week). The 
international rescue effort was coordinated from the Peter the Great (see Exhibit 3 for the apparent 
command and control arrangements.) Ships communicated with ships using their VHF radios and 
international marine communications—however, these conventions were developed primarily for 
port operations and for summoning rescues, and were ill- suited to carrying out non-routine tasks. 
Russell felt “it was difficult to work out who was in charge”—partly, because there was no previous 
precedent for a similar operation: 
There isn’t a common communications system. There isn’t a common language. There isn’t 
a common protocol—and anyway, the Russian commanders would have been very reluctant to 
speak directly to the Western commanders without approval. So the link through the [British] 
Embassy and Moscow was quite important, particularly initially. […] We haven’t practiced 
operations with multiple ships in some sort of organized group with the Russians. And now 
that’s really what we were trying to do. We were trying to organize a group of ships and 
people to do a common task, and we had no precedent for doing that with the Russians. There 
was also no pre-agreed process for the British rescue forces to work for Admiral Skorgen. 
Russian naval command remained firm on the need to keep the international rescue parties at a 
distance from the Kursk datum, and had directed both the Normand Pioneer and the Seaway Eagle to 
take a position 14 nautical miles from the accident site.  
Meanwhile, Rear Admiral Verich and his team of submersible pilots continued—weather 
permitting—the frustrating cycle of short and futile dives to the Kursk and long battery-recharges. By 
Thursday, the weather was letting up, the available two rescue submersibles were both ready to 
launch, and more experienced pilots had arrived. Despite the swift current, one pilot managed to land 
the first submersible on the Kursk eight times, and on the final attempt succeeded to hover in a stable 
position over the hatch for twenty minutes –an incredible feat of skill and stamina- while attempting 
but ultimately failing to create the necessary air seal.xv Next, the second mini-sub made an attempt, 
but upon entering the water, a leak (probably the result of poor maintenance) caused an uncontrolled 
dive. The pilots managed to steady the damaged mini-sub, but were in grave danger themselves and 
had to abandon the operationxvi. 
“Are there any signs of life?”  
Since Tuesday, 15 August, the families of the Kursk sailors had been campaigning to save their 
husbands, fathers, and sons, calling Moscow newspapers and radio and TV stations across Russia. 
Their assessment was that the admirals were only worried about the submarine, not the men trapped 
inside.xvii On Tuesday evening, they were invited to attend an official meeting at the Officers Club of 
the Vidyaevo naval base. A vice admiral from Moscow sought to reassure them: “Yes, they are in 
peril, but they are alive, and our Fleet is doing all it can to rescue them. Have faith and stay patient for 
a little longer.” The same evening, Igor Baranov, the construction director of the Kursk, spoke at a 
press conference: “The ship is the best in the world in terms of the life support for the sailors. We 
cannot know the reason for the accident or the scale of it. But in the Kursk there is food, water and 
regeneration systems. […] It is possible the entire crew can be saved. [They might survive] five or 
possibly six more days.”xviii  
Meanwhile, the Northern Fleet Press Service officially released the news that knocking had been 
heard from inside the Kursk, without disclosing any further details.xix  
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As the week passed, Russian media grew more and more critical and even furious. On Thursday, 
the Kremlin announced that president Putin would not break off his holiday on the Black Sea coast, 
where he was also performing routine presidential duties, as his presence would only distract Navy 
commanders, but he was being briefed every two hours. Admiral Kuroyedov declared that the 
emergency supplies in the Kursk could keep the sailors alive for at least one more week. On Friday, 
the Komsomolskaya Pravda, a national daily, ran a front page headline “SOLD FOR 18,000 RUBLES . . .” 
followed by the names of the Kursk sailors (which it obtained by allegedly bribing an anonymous 
officer at Fleet headquarters with 18,000 rubles, equivalent to $645) and spoke out against “crass 
military culture that valued machines more than men.” The Sevodnya newspaper debated the politics 
of the international rescue mission and quoted a Defense Ministry official saying: “. . . the admirals 
think everything will end in political catastrophe if a single Russian sailor is rescued from [the 
submarine] with foreign help.”xx  
On board the Seaway Eagle, the Norwegian rescue team speculated about the Kursk sailors’ 
survival chances. Offsite manager Graham Mann, who was in charge of the divers, had a clear 
philosophy that allowed the speculations to end: “Unless I know they are dead, I will work on the 
assumption they are alive.”xxi In almost the same words, Russell declared to his team: “Until we know 
for certain that there’s no chance, we carry on with the rescue operation.”xxii 
Throughout the week, the daily situation reports sent by UKSRS from the Normand Pioneer to 
Northwood were asking myriads of questions directed at the Norwegian divers, the Russian rescue 
service, and their own intelligence. Starting with an urgent “are there any signs of life?”, the questions 
touched upon a wide range of expertise, including the naval engineers in the UK Ministry of Defense, 
who were studying Kursk hatch drawings they had received from the Russians in order to plan how 
to dock LR5 with the submarine, and the Institute of Naval Medicine at Laverstoke in Hampshire, in 
order to learn more about the likely condition of the Kursk sailors. Russell commented:  
We would make a single request with all these questions back to what we call our 
Operating Authority—our senior operations person, if you like. And he would then take 
responsibility for finding out the answers from the experts, whatever they were, and getting 
the answers back to us. So it wouldn’t be our job to say, Oh gosh, we need to ask that particular 
engineer in that particular department. That would be the job of the Operating Authority. And 
he would certainly go across boundaries, and nobody would expect him to be constrained by 
silos. 
By Friday, UKSRS had learnt that the Kursk’s hatch dimensions were compatible with LR5’s, 
noting in their daily situational report: “Now [we are] as confident as we can reasonably be that 
[docking] successfully is possible.” The questions probing the Russian rescue effort and the condition 
of the Kursk sailors remained unanswered—UKSRS had to go by the media reports. 
UKSRS also sent dozens of requests for equipment and personnel. During the week, they procured 
a Royal Navy officer who was a Russian linguist, an underwater microphone from home base capable 
of detecting the slightest sound onboard, and soda-lime curtains from the Norwegian Submarine 
Service to absorb carbon dioxide. By Friday night, UKSRS had tentative plans in place for the “LR5 
flight.”  
The most controversial aspect of this, having been debated by the team for two days, was the 
composition of the mini-sub’s crew. With a crew of two, LR5 could rescue 16 sailors at a time. Russell 
anticipated that a Russian-speaking submariner was also needed, as well as some Russian 
submariners to “supervise what goes on.” LR5, in theory, could have been used for intelligence 
gathering, and Russell surmised that he needed to give the Russians a way to allay their suspicions.  
At close to midnight, Russell concluded his situational report with the following “intentions” for 
the next 24 hours: (a) Meet with Russian and Norwegian colleagues, in order to resolve 
technical/safety issues and command and control arrangements; (b) conduct initial survey around the 
hatch area with LR5; (c) subject to resolution of technical/safety issues with Russians and favorable 
hatch-area survey, start sequence of LR5 flights.  
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Saturday, 19 August, aboard the Seaway Eagle 
At 11:30 AM, exactly a week after the double explosion aboard the Kursk, the three rescue parties 
held a summit meeting on the Seaway Eagle. Chaired by a Norwegian submarine captain, the meeting 
brought together, for the first time, Admiral Verich, Commodore Russell, and Stolt’s offshore diving 
manager, Graham Mann. For Russell, the meeting was a disappointment. In Saturday’s situational 
report, he noted: “Following grateful welcome from Russians, it very quickly became clear that the 
Russian aim for this meeting was to obtain agreement to a predetermined plan [of their making]; to 
use Norwegian [divers] first for inspections and a hull tap check, holding LR5 in reserve if required.”  
Diving operations would start on Sunday morning and Mann agreed to put two diving teams into 
saturation, insisting that they would first be allowed to undertake a detailed risk assessment survey 
around the submarine. Verich was not authorized to agree to this on the spot. Having promised to 
return in the evening to discuss the diving plan with Mann, Verich was about to leave the Seaway 
Eagle, when Russell “pressed” him “to address the deployment of LR5.” However, Verich discounted 
LR5’s capabilities, declaring that if the Russian submersibles could not form a seal with the 
submarine’s escape hatch, no other mini-sub could. Russell made a futile attempt to explain LR5’s 
superior capabilities: “It was clear that the Admiral had been briefed on the pre-refit capabilities of 
LR5 and chose to ignore briefing on her improved capability.” In a desperate gesture to persuade 
Verich, Russell invited him to visit the Normand Pioneer and view LR5 for himself, but Verich 
declined.  
Verich appeared to believe that, in fact, there could be no survivors left on the Kursk, citing seven 
days as the maximum amount of time they could have survived. He wanted the Norwegian divers to 
confirm his belief that the Kursk had been flooded, so that “the rescue could be called off and the 
Russian People told.” Russell argued that, in the Royal Navy’s experience, there could be no clear-cut 
estimates for how many days trapped submariners could survive:  
The Russian view about this was almost mechanistic, really. They had worked out—I don’t 
know on what basis they’d worked out—that the air would run out after seven days, and 
therefore after seven days everyone is dead. Life and death just isn’t like that. You just don’t 
know all the variables, and even if you do, these are only estimates. Nobody’s ever run an 
experiment to see how long people survive in these conditions.  
Russell also realized that the Russian rescue team was no longer in “rescue” mode:  
The Russian mindset appeared to have already shifted from rescue to salvage. Now, you 
can speculate as to why that was. Some of it might have been, look, we know how long they’ve 
been down there, we know when the explosion was, we don’t think they can have survived. 
All our books tell us they’re dead. Or it could be more to do with the fact that they really 
wanted to get this thing ended because it was a political and military embarrassment. But 
whatever, there was no doubt there was a completely different approach to the problem. That’s 
a key moment, really, when you realize that your ambition, your objective, is not shared by the 
other side. 
The international rescue summit ended. Admiral Popov ordered the Seaway Eagle five nautical 
miles closer to the Kursk datum, while the Normand Pioneer remained where it was, 45 minutes 
steaming time from the scene. Russell wryly commented: “14 nautical miles is a long way away. It’s 
over the horizon.” But clearly, the distance between the leaders of the Russian and British rescue 
forces was immeasurably longer.  
“Submariner to submariner…” 
Later that day, the Normand Pioneer received a visitor—Vice Admiral Oleg Burtsev, commander of 
the Kursk’s flotilla. Unannounced, Burtsev indicated he came to talk as a submariner to a submariner. 
Russell felt instant rapport with him and later noted in his situational report:  
11 
 
There appears to have been no communication between Burtsev and Verich. Burtsev did not 
know where Verich was and indicated that he didn’t particularly care. Burtsev promised to 
bring [two engineers who are familiar with the Kursk’s escape tower and hatch mechanism] to 
the Normand Pioneer as soon as possible, to confirm the exact technical details. Although the 
Northern Fleet’s submersibles are planned to operate through the night until 07:00, Burtsev 
was keen to employ LR5 as quickly as safely possible thereafter. He was briefed on LR5 
capabilities and commented that, although conditions were probably on the limits, he was keen 
to give it a chance. Atmospherics were business-like and extremely warm throughout. He 
departed after 45 minutes. 
 
In his summary reflections of that day, Russell concluded: “There appears to be considerable 
confusion as to what the Russian plan is and who is in charge of it. Nevertheless, Burtsev is clearly a 
man who is well motivated and liable to get things moving. If he convinces Popov that the current 
rather pedestrian approach should be abandoned, then LR5 could be in action tomorrow.” 
UKSRS spent Sunday waiting in vain for the Russian submarine experts Burtsev had promised. At 
the end of the day, Russell concluded his briefest situation report: “No progress obtaining submarine 
experts since Admiral Burtsev’s visit last night. In view of apparent intention of Russians to start 
diving operations [deploying the Stolt divers], I do not expect LR5 to be employed in the near future 
and believe the outcome of these diving operations may well determine the nature and extent of 
further rescue efforts.”  
Diving operations started on Sunday at 8AM and lasted all day. While the submarine’s hatch 
remained closed, the divers performed equalizing-valve checks and by the end of the day, produced 
only inconclusive evidence on the state of the submarine. On one hand, the escape tower was flooded, 
but on the other, there was still a chance that the ninth compartment was sealed and dry. The divers 
also reported that the hatch had appeared undamaged and recommended that the LR5 should be 
deployed to attempt rescue. The Royal Navy submersible would be of use only if the escape tower 
was dry – and that possibility still existed.xxiii 
At 2AM on Monday, Admiral Popov ordered the Normand Pioneer to the accident site and ordered 
Verich to allow the deployment of the LR5. While UKSRS was preparing to launch LR5, shortly after 
dawn, the top hatch of the submarine swung open. There were no divers around the stern of the 
Kursk at the time – but the buoyancy bag they had fitted on the hatch proved sufficient to open the lid 
during low tide that morning3. The divers could now enter the escape tower and examine the lower 
hatch directly, carrying out another check of whether the pressure inside the Kursk was different from 
sea pressure. It wasn’t, indicating that the sub was flooded. At 10:30AM, divers opened the bottom 
hatch and lowered a small video camera into the ninth compartment. The rescuers had pictured the 
sailors dying from either flooding or from carbon-dioxide poisoning – but they now saw evidence of a 
fire.4 The camera showed blackened walls, cracked and blistered paintwork, and eerily, a body 
floating face down.  
Epilogue  
At 11:40AM, aboard the Peter the Great, Commodore Russell was invited to meet Admiral 
Kuroyedov. Russell recalled a solemn meeting with no smiles, all handshakes and salutes, which in 
the end took an unexpected turn:  
                                                          
3 Russell explained, “The divers had fitted a floatation device on the upper hatch. When the lid subsequently opened, it proved 
that the pressure on either side of the hatch was sea pressure—we had direct evidence that the escape tower was flooded. So 
the next question was: is the pressure inside the submarine the same as the pressure inside the escape tower?” 
4 According to the post mortem, the Kursk sailors perished in a flash fire ignited by one of the air-regeneration cartridges. 
Changing those chemical cartridges was the sailors’ lifeline, but also posed a lethal threat. One of the survivors, while ripping 
open the packaging, appears to have fumbled and dropped it. By this time the sailors must have been standing in almost waist-
high water, and the chemicals, having reacted violently with water under the rising pressure, ignited a flash fire. 
12 
 
Interestingly, my discussions on board the Russian flagship were much more open and 
apparently sincere. I think we did at last break through the ice. We talked also about how 
maybe some good would come out of this. Kuroyedov asked, “Do you think we should learn 
more about each other’s escape capabilities, so that we can work more together in the future?” I 
said I thought that would be something that the UK would be very pleased to do, making 
foreign policy on the hoof, really. After eating some terrible pieces of sausage, he said, “Well, 
thank you very much for trying to help. What will you do now?” I said, “Well, if there’s 
nothing further that we can do, we’ll depart and head back.” He asked, “Do you need to ask 
Northwood?” I said, “No, no, I’m quite happy that if there’s nothing further I can do to help 
you, then we will leave and let you get on with your work.” He said, “Ah. I would have to ask 
Moscow.”  
Later that day, at the request of the Normand Pioneer’s crew, Russell led a memorial service 
dedicated to the Kursk sailors. Soon after, the Normand Pioneer was exchanging parting signals with 
the Peter the Great. The Russian crew, standing in line with their naval caps held aloft, cheered ship. 
Russell thought to himself wearily, “So characteristic of the paradoxes of this mission. Amongst so 
much suspicion, at the very end, a striking gesture of dignity and friendship. A symbol, perhaps, of 
what might have been achieved.”  
Discussion  
In the remainder of this paper, we shall focus on the rescue organization that was forming as a 
result of the involvement of different parties in (what turned out to be) a failed multi-party rescue 
mission.  
Both the United Kingdom and Norway offered assistance with the submarine rescue mission to 
the Russian Navy. The first question is what motivated them. One possibility is political reasoning, 
particularly in the case of Norway, which has got both historic and geographic ties to Russia and has 
collaborated with its large neighbor in the past. Norway was also motivated by a perceived need to 
protect itself from a potential nuclear disaster on its doorstep. The U.K. may have sought to improve 
relations with Russia, especially in light of Vladimir Putin’s election to the Russian presidency just 
four months prior to the incident. While political and diplomatic motivations must have played a 
central role at the higher levels of military and government, the explosive international media 
attention devoted to the high-profile calamity triggered many other actors to get involved at their 
own initiative. 
Some Western individuals who got proactively involved in the rescue effort (e.g. Commodore 
David Russell, Admiral Einar Skorgen) decided to do so instinctively, based on compassion and a 
moral conviction (“the law of the sea”). As explained by Russell, the “law of the sea” carries weight 
among (supposedly) all navies and dictates that, during peacetime, sailors have a duty to rescue other 
sailors at sea, if they can. He further emphasized that, in this case, the feeling of empathy between 
submariners was a particularly strong bond. Besides, the opportunity to help was given - Russell’s 
Submarine Rescue Service unit happened to be ready to leave on a training session in the 
Mediterranean, so Russell, without waiting for the politicians to order him to do so, quickly turned 
the operation into a live exercise in the Barents. Skorgen likewise took initiative in mobilizing his 
government’s resources and sending expert deep-sea divers to the scene. 
Action triggered by one’s values can be fast and decisive, but may also lead to unpredictable and 
unexpected results. The question is therefore twofold: first, were the driving values and objectives 
focussing on ‘rescuing people’ indeed shared by the Russian side? Second, how to create on the hoof a 
network organization that would coordinate multiparty action, while joining the three parties into a 
temporary structure?  
The following quote by Russell summed up the challenge: 
“We haven’t practiced operations with multiple ships in some form of organized group with the 
Russians. We obviously have with NATO, but not with the Russians. That’s really what we were trying 
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to do. We were trying to organize a group of ships and people to do a common task, and we had no 
precedent for doing that with the Russians.” 
With no precedent for such coordinated action in the past and no pre-agreed joint routines— i.e. in 
the absence of habituated, learnt ways of responding to problems (Weick, 1990) — the three parties 
had to quickly set up a virtual organization to enact an emergency operation.  
Emergency operations typically require strong commitment to others: putting aside self-interest 
and territoriality for cooperation and mutual support (Simons, 2005). That is, in order to best use the 
combined (and together sufficient) rescue assets of all three parties, a highly responsive organization 
was required. Organizational theorists have long advocated that maximizing spans of influence 
(interactions) and support (shared commitment) is key in the design of highly responsive 
organizations, but so are broad accountability (empowerment) and the pooling of resources. In 
particular, it has been argued by disaster management scholars that an organization that places 
emphasis on communication and empowerment is better prepared to adapt in the face of non-routine 
emergency situations (Howitt and Leonard, 2009). Routine behavior can work against cognitive 
narrowing effectively only when the situation is well-understood (a “routine emergency”), but may 
break down in the face of novel risks – hence novel situations require actors to experiment, and 
leadership and organization that enable them to do so (Weick, 1990; Howitt and Leonard, 2009). 
During times of crisis, enhanced interpersonal communication, trust, and openness can in addition 
serve to counteract the loss of requisite variety in ideas that occurs under stress (Mandler, 1982; 
Weick, 1990).   
Understandably, the Russian fleet’s attitude toward the Westerners was characterized by distrust, 
suspicion, and a strong reluctance to share information proactively. Meanwhile, UKSRS was 
challenged to demonstrate its commitment to the rescue and the sincerity of the claim that it had no 
hidden, self-serving agendas. 
Using Simon’s Levers of Organizational Design framework, we can now compare and contrast the 
two organizations whose differences became particularly salient during the rescue mission (UKSRS 
and the Russian naval rescue organization), in order to understand the challenges of combining them 
into the aforementioned combined (if temporary) entity.   
Span of Control 
  Span of control represents the range of resources for which a manager is given decision rights and 
held accountable. Resources include people, equipment, inventory and other assets such as accounts 
receivable. For any manager, span of control answers the question, “What resources do I have at my 
disposal to get the job done?” (Simons, 2005) 
  In terms of decision rights, the Russian command structure entailed a narrow span of control for 
its officers, who had to seek approval from superiors for nearly every decision and use of resources. 
Independent action by commanders was not encouraged, exemplified by Kuroyedov’s admission to 
Russell that he would not even be allowed to sail the flagship Peter the Great back to port without 
prior approval from Moscow. Due to years of budget cuts, officers in the Russian navy at the time of 
the disaster were expected to achieve their tasks with very limited resources in terms of staff, 
physical assets and equipment, as well. Because of lack of funds, men of the Northern Fleet and 
Russian SRS were generally stressed, under-paid, and charged with the use of poorly-maintained, 
often out-of-date equipment.  
  The British naval tradition, stretching back many centuries, maintained a wide span of control for 
its captains, devolving decision-making authority (consistent with strategic objectives) to the level of 
senior officers. Russell attributes this independent, entrepreneurial culture to the history of the Royal 
Navy and the need for officers in far-flung reaches of the world to make decisions independently 
without the ability to communicate with superiors. 
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  Furthermore, the British rescue team controlled high-quality, well-maintained assets, which 
included one of the world’s best rescue submersibles (LR5). Financial facts also confirm the huge gap 
between the UK and Russian budgets allocated to the rescue organizations: The financial constraints 
were particularly felt by the Russian search-and-rescue forces. Year after year, their budget was 
slashed and at the time of the disaster, bottomed out at $14,0005. In contrast, with an annual budget 
varying between GBP 500,000 and 1 million ($0.8–1.6 million), UKSRS was suitably equipped and 
funded, and its personnel was more than adequately trained to carry out a rescue mission in the 
relatively shallow waters of the Barents. 
Span of Accountability 
  Span of accountability is defined as the range of tradeoffs that affects the performance measures 
used to evaluate a manager’s achievement. For any manager, span of accountability answers the 
question, “What measures will be used to evaluate my performance?” and may be set widely or 
narrowly according to how many tradeoffs a manager is allowed in order to achieve desired levels of 
performance. Individuals accountable for high-level, broadly defined goals (such as mission success 
or business profit) can afford more trade-offs than those measured on narrow output measures such 
as headcount or specific expenses in an operating budget (Simons, 2005b:56). When managers need 
more than the resources under their direct control to achieve what is asked of them, they must 
become entrepreneurial, and draw on their ingenuity, interpersonal networks, and influence skills to 
pull together the resources needed to achieve their goals (Simons, 2005). 
  In the Russian Navy, span of accountability was typically set narrow, allowing officers and men 
few tradeoffs in the execution of their duties. For instance, another Northern Fleet submarine 
participating in the exercises, the Karelia, felt the shockwaves from the explosions on board the Kursk 
but did not break the surface to communicate its detection or clarify what the explosions could have 
signified. The captain and crew of the other vessel were accountable only for their own role in the 
exercise, and they were not “primed” to raise problems outside their immediate focus of concern.  
  In the Royal Navy, span of accountability was wide. Officers were expected to act 
entrepreneurially to achieve broadly defined mission goals. For instance, Commodore Russell 
independently authorized the commissioning of a cargo plane to transport the LR5 to Norway to 
assist the Russians with their rescue effort. In the U.K. organization, Russell was commended for 
skipping the normal, orderly approval process for initiating an international endeavor at the highest 
level of military command in favor of quick, autonomous action that corresponded to his perception 
of the pressure of time.  
Span of Influence 
 Span of influence is defined by the range of interactions one needs to master across organizational 
silos and boundaries in order to perform one’s task.  For any manager, span of influence answers the 
question, “How wide do I need to cast my net for information and support in achieving my goals?” 
(Simons, 2005). An employee with a narrow span of influence does not need to pay much attention to 
people outside his small area to do his job effectively. An individual with a wide span of influence, 
however, must interact extensively with, and influence, others (Simons, 2005b:57). 
 The span of influence in the top-down Russian naval organization was narrow. Units such as the 
rescue services commanded by Admiral Verich were apparently expected to complete tasks with only 
their own resources at hand, while influencing other units and superiors was not seen as required for 
the execution of their duties. For instance, Verich refused the deployment (and even the inspection) of 
UKSRS’ rescue sub. There was also very limited interaction between Verich and Admiral Burtsev, 
commander of the First Submarine Flotilla of which the Kursk was a part. During the week of the 
                                                          
5 Evidence cited by Robert Moore in front of a Harvard Business School classroom on 20 February 2014. 
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crisis, in contradiction to Verich, Burtsev communicated to UKSRS and the Norwegian rescue forces 
that their help and the deployment of LR5 was indeed desired and welcome and promised to bring 
engineers and technical experts to the scene. Evidently, however, Burtsev lacked the span of influence 
required to rally key decision-makers in higher echelons that would have been necessary to enable 
more collaboration with the Western rescuers.  
  The span of influence in the U.K. rescue organization was higher. On one hand, Russell and his 
team reached out to many others within and outside the Royal Navy including the British naval 
attaché in Moscow, and intelligence and other expert backing from academic institutions. On the 
other hand, Russell and his team did not need to reach out to these various entities directly – they 
operated through an intermediary (the “Operating Authority”). This limited their need to interact 
with others substantially – conserving time and energy for the task at hand.  
Span of Support 
 Span of support is defined by the amount of help that an individual can expect from people 
in other organizational units. For any manager, span of support answers the question, “How much 
support can I expect when I reach out to others for help in achieving my goals?” A wide span of 
support becomes critically important when an organizational unit requires a strong commitment from 
others in the organization in order to meet its objectives. According to Simons, this span is the least 
amenable to ‘adjustment’ as it is largely determined by people’s sense of shared responsibilities, 
which in turn stems from an organization’s culture and values (Simons, 2005b). But social 
psychologists and leadership scholars such as Beer (2009), highlight four factors that influence the 
transformation of individual responsibility into shared responsibility (and thus may broaden the span 
of support in an organization): 
1. Shared purpose increases group cohesion and limits parochialism and subgroup fragmentation. 
2. Group identification or similarity between group members enhances the strength of group 
identity. 
3. Trust - the expectation that another party will perform a desired action in the absence of 
monitoring or control. 
4. Equity - the fairness of the distribution of resources and rewards among those who contribute 
to the organization’s success. 
 Span of support in case of the Russian rescue services was narrow as this unit could not reliably 
look to others for aid in accomplishing its tasks. The budget cuts that so reduced the Russian span of 
control also had the effect of eroding the sense of equity within the organization. Defects in the 
compensation system—including severe delays and, often, failure to pay what was owed—might 
have contributed to reduced morale and undermined the shared purpose and group identification of 
Russian sailors and officers in general. Furthermore, given the apparent lack of a shared and 
unequivocal commitment to save the Kursk sailors, Admiral Burtsev’s expectation of support from 
within the Russian military organization could not have been met. 
 In contrast, the UK rescue forces enjoyed a wide span of support. The cooperation and practiced 
coordination among NATO allies built a shared group identity and assured the British in their 
expectation that others from outside their own organization would make themselves available to help 
achieve common goals. To the British, joining forces with Norwegian deep-sea divers in this mission 
was unproblematic given their shared purpose and the trust they had established through past joint 
activities.  
 Figure 1 sums up the discussion of the patterns of organizational design displayed by UKSRS and 
the Russian Rescue Services. The patterns that emerged are by no means pathological in themselves. 
This is because in both cases, the sum of the spans that approximate the  supply of organizational 
resources provided to individuals (span of control; span of support) are roughly in balance with the 
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aggregate demand for organizational resources (approximated by the span of accountability and span 
of influence). In other words, to paraphrase Simons (2005b), the supply of resources (span of control 
plus span of support) roughly equal the demand (span of accountability plus span of influence) at 
both UKSRS and at the Russian Rescue Services. 
 Moreover, each of the two configurations is typical (and telling) of organizations that execute 
very different strategies. The Russian configuration resembles many organizations that standardize 
work by using plans and performance measures that allow few trade-offs, minimize resources 
allocated to specific units or positions, require people to pay attention only to their own jobs, and 
reward them accordingly. This low-cost configuration is particularly well-suited to companies 
following a low-cost strategy (see discussion of Wal-Mart’s strategy and the corresponding low-cost 
design configuration in Simons (2005b)), and those that must abide by strict rules and operating 
procedures (e.g. power plants). In sum, the Russian configuration is typical and telling of a 
hierarchical, tightly controlled organization, and (ignoring pathological resource shortages) by 
Simons’ equilibrium criterion, it could well have been an adequate configuration for its strategic 
purposes. 
 In contrast, the pattern displayed by UKSRS is typical of an innovation-oriented, entrepreneurial 
firm, which allocates more people, assets and infrastructure to tasks, but also empowers people more, 
and holds them accountable to even more. In fact, this kind of organization creates an entrepreneurial 
drive by holding individuals accountable for very broad mission goals, applying broad success 
criteria, which in turn spur managers to be more creative, and to figure out how to succeed without 
direct control of all the resources they need. In other words, people in the entrepreneurial configuration 
are typically held accountable for more than what they actually control. Again, this configuration is 
by no means unique – many a marketing and sales manager in diverse industries could testify to job 
(and unit) designs that force people “out of the box”, as it were. As long as the supply of, and demand 
for, resources that apply to such jobs and units are in rough balance, these configurations are viable. 
However, the Kursk rescue failure shows the frictions and tensions that become quickly apparent 
when two of these very different (if individually sustainable) organizational configurations come 
together in one mission. 
 
 
Figure 1: Comparing the four levers of organizational design 
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We can now explore some of the frictions (and set them against the more positive developments) 
that occurred when these rescue organizations tried to collaborate. We shall consider how these 
dynamics affected the design of the “virtual organization” that was temporarily brought into being, 
and in particular, how the dynamics affected multiparty commitment to help others. 
Considering the levers of organization design, there were both promising developments and 
frictions in the dynamics of the rescue organization: 
Promising developments: 
Increased span of control: The promising developments during the timeframe of the case began with 
the Russian Federation’s decision to accept Western support, which enhanced the rescue 
organization’s span of control dramatically by contributing valuable resources and personnel from 
the UK and Norway.  
Span of support: The span of support was also widened for the rescuers by the Russian Navy’s 
willingness to share some critical information, including the datum of the Kursk’s position and 
technical drawings of the submarine’s escape hatch. Group identification was enhanced by the 
submariner-to-submariner bond between Russell and Burtsev (as well as the seafarers’ bond between 
them and Stolt representative Graham Mann, whom Russell described as also “being of the same 
ilk”). The eventual confirmation that the Kursk’s hatch dimensions were compatible with UKSRS’s 
cutting-edge submersible craft, further encouraged those who shared the shared goal of “rescuing 
people”, and especially Russell, Mann and Burtsev.  
Frictions 
Inflexibility of Russian organizational configuration: Although the arrival of UK and Norwegian 
assistance allowed for the widening of the span of control, the additional resources ultimately failed 
to result in a successful rescue. The narrow span on every lever characterizing the Russian rescue 
organization might have mirrored the top-down, tightly controlled, bureaucratic configuration of the 
Northern Fleet at the time. But this configuration was not responsive to the urgent needs of the rescue 
operation, illustrated by its inability to respond quickly to information requests – presumably, due to 
the lengthy chain of approval such requests would need to go through as they get passed up the 
chain of command. 
Barriers to communication: One challenge to success was the Russian refusal to co-locate the multi-
party command structure on its flagship, the Peter the Great, necessitating formal and restrictive ship-
to-ship communications. Language barriers complicated matters, as well.   
Lack of trust: A salient barrier to a shared purpose and strong commitment was the pervasive lack 
of trust, particularly mistrust of Western intentions by (many of) the Russian naval officers. Trust 
hinged on an assertion that the Western rescuers would not use the mission for intelligence gathering 
—an assurance that UKSRS attempted to provide but ultimately failed to convey. It is worth noting 
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that Russell’s personal background in intelligence gathering (as a “former enemy”) could have been a 
serious obstacle6. 
Barriers to shared purpose: Another challenge was posed by a divide within the Russian leadership. 
In one camp were the officers and men of the Northern Fleet, best represented by Admiral Burtsev, 
who shared a deep bond with the trapped submariners and were fully committed to their rescue. In 
another camp were officials in Moscow and senior naval officers, who had (according to media 
reports) no interest in seeing the West succeed in a rescue effort where Russia had tried and failed. 
The division inside the Russian navy did not only delay the deployment of the international rescue 
forces until it was too late, but also denied the combined (if temporary) organization of the shared 
purpose that might have united its disparate groups.  
Cognitive narrowing: According to stress theorists and disaster experts, individuals under stress 
undergo cognitive narrowing and tend to fall back onto routines while failing to take note of 
peripheral cues that could help alleviate the source of stress (Mandler, 1982; Weick, 1990). Further, 
stress is heightened as individuals come closer to achieving their goals before falling short—the 
smaller the discrepancy between reality and desire, the greater the stress felt by the individual. 
Consider the sequence of events among Russian naval commanders at the time of the rescue 
operation with Norwegian and British forces. Leading up to the moment when foreign help arrived, 
Admiral Verich had attempted for several days to carry out rescue operations under high pressure, in 
full view of the Northern Fleet’s commanders and sailors, gathered aboard the flagship Peter the Great. 
The submersibles had come tantalizingly close to docking with the Kursk’s rescue hatch, only to be 
foiled repeatedly by battery failure, poor equipment performance, and hazardous conditions. As 
Verich and his team came close but failed to secure their submersibles to the sunken submarine, the 
Northern Fleet’s scrutiny added to the pressure. 
In this state of stress, Verich’s cognitive field might have narrowed, to some extent explaining his 
insistence on continuing with his own routine, refusing to accept ‘involvement of strangers’ (Turner, 
1976) – which would have been a huge deviation from routine, and under the circumstances, an 
interference with established policy. Instead, as stress theory predicts, he kept reverting to learned 
routines of behavior. Habitual concern for Russia’s pride in the face of Western attention—especially 
in light of the pressure he faced from his naval comrades looking on—may have also caused Verich to 
stubbornly devote his now-decreased supply of cognitive attention to saving the Russian submariners 
without accepting foreign assistance. In sum, cognitive narrowing may help explain Verich’s 
seemingly irrational refusal to accept UKSRS’s offer to make use of the LR5 submersible.  
Within the rescue organization at large, the effect of stress was to intensify the already hierarchical 
configuration of the Russian naval organization. Strict vertical lines of reporting were observed in 
communication and decision making, while lateral communication was scarce. The result was an 
inability to share information across the organization and reconcile different perceptions of risk and 
priorities between the Western forces and their Russian counterparts.   
The above frictions limited the extent to which the combined organization could expand its spans 
of accountability, influence, and support in order to make efficient use of the full range of resources 
available at the scene. Figure 2 illustrates the unbalanced configuration, which was, ultimately, a 
recipe for misalignment and resulted in the inefficient use of available resources. 
  
                                                          
6 Observation made by Russell himself in front of a Harvard Business School classroom on 20 February 2014. 
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Figure 2.  The Kursk rescue mission: levers of organizational design for the temporary 
multiparty rescue organization 
 
 
Towards pluralistic risk management 
Although commitment to others in complex organizations can, according to leadership experts, be 
engineered, in a multiparty setting it takes particularly skillful and politically astute leadership to 
foster shared values and goals, to create group identity, to establish trust, and to ensure equity. The 
Kursk rescue case shows that there are significant limits to such engineering, causing unilateral, top-
down efforts at increasing the spans of control, influence, accountability and support likely to fail. 
Multiparty commitments to others, if they are to become established, necessitate (in principle) time, 
careful groundwork, and a process to guide ongoing, productive interactions. Taking steps to create 
such commitment, according to Simons (2005) and other organizational experts would involve the 
establishment of pre-established protocols for communication and routines for action, as well as pre-
agreed priorities and shared values to be referred to in specific (e.g. emergency) situations. These 
protocols would also have to incorporate clear reporting relationships and resource allocations for the 
multiparty organization, which would have to form on a temporary basis. 
However, today’s complex firms, joint ventures and other organizational networks are fraught 
with a significant dispersion in objectives, value systems, evaluative principles, and risk-assessments 
– as was apparent in the Kursk rescue mission as well. The most striking differences concerned, first, 
the expectations of finding survivors at all and, relating to this, the objectives: whether or not to carry 
on with the rescue mission. While UKSRS and the Norwegian divers refused to accept a point 
estimate for the life expectancy of the Kursk sailors and were prepared to carry on with the mission 
until all sailors were confirmed dead, the Russian navy experts estimated the survivors’ life 
expectancy to be 7-8 days and after this time, advised the admirals to shift from rescue to salvage.  
This illustrates just how difficult it is to reconcile inherently competing goals and agendas, which 
are often deeply rooted in diverse value systems, competing evaluative principles and conflicting risk 
assessments.  
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An important implication is that risk management, as we have come to know it, requires a rethink. 
Risk-management blueprints for measurable uncertainties typically follow the cybernetic ideal of 
control (COSO, 2004; ISO, 2009). That is, they are prescribed for situations in which the underlying 
risks, organizational tasks and processes are perceived to be familiar, measurable and sufficiently 
near in time, so that measurement and feedback are available to managers. Under these conditions 
traditional management control systems, also known in the management control literature as 
diagnostic, or cybernetic, controls are workable. In this domain, risk managers make progress by 
expanding the scope and reach of diagnostic controls in order to make more uncertainties 
measurable, and thus, manageable.   
However, our increasingly complex and connected world fosters greater interdependence inside 
and among organizations - resulting in network organizations, in which diverse evaluative principles 
coexist in an active rivalry. In such organizations management (and arguably, risk management) 
becomes the art of facilitating constructive rivalry, with the adherents of the contending frameworks 
offering reasoned justifications for their course of action (Stark, 2009). The danger is that arguments 
displace action and nothing is accomplished, as was the case in the Kursk rescue mission. Stark 
proposes an organizational form, which he calls heterarchy, as the solution. Neither harmony nor 
cacophony, heterarchy is an ideal for organized dissonance – a collective sense of timing of when to 
make temporary settlements to get the job done, with the knowledge that any particular action may 
not be the ultimate resolution of the inherent disagreements (Stark, 2009:740). Stark argues that 
heterarchies particularly suit innovative organizations that further simultaneous projects, and 
disaster-management organizations that need to recover fast and respond quickly in episodes of 
crisis. In these, top-down patterns of communication perform much more poorly than decentralized 
networks on tasks of distributed problem-solving. This is possible because effective search for 
solutions in novel, non-routine situations can no longer be departmentalized, and likewise, 
information can no longer be compartmentalized (Howitt and Leonard, 2009).  But coordination 
becomes more complex. In such cases, Stark argues, authority must be (and in collaborative, well-
functioning heterarchies, has been observed to) spread along lines of lateral accountability: that is, 
people still report to their "superiors", but are accountable to other work teams. In other words, 
authority is no longer delegated vertically, but instead emerges laterally, and thus becomes 
distributed (Stark, 2009: 643). 
As we are increasingly confronted by situations, which, by their very nature, do not lend 
themselves to management by hierarchical authority, so does the ideal of traditional, cybernetic 
control become impractical and obsolete. The conditions under which cybernetic control is workable 
(high authority, low ambiguity, high goal clarity) are not present in domains plagued by distributed 
authority, multiple objectives, multiple evaluative principles, and ambiguity. The ideal type of 
heterarchy, and its empirical manifestations, the various pluralistic systems we encounter (such as the 
makeshift rescue organization in the Kursk rescue mission) require a pluralistic control process that can 
resolve conflicting objectives, and can arbitrate between different value systems and competing 
groups of expertise.  
Having focused on the empirical manifestations of the cybernetic risk control approach embedded 
in risk-management guidelines such as COSO’s Enterprise Risk Management and ISO 31,000, risk-
management scholars have hitherto paid little attention to how organizations can (and do) 
incorporate pluralistic control principles into their risk-management practices.  
Political theorists, however, have long observed the presence of pluralistic control, particularly in 
adversarial bureaucracies (Dunsire, 1990; Hood and Jones, 1996). In fact, several descriptions and 
prescriptions exist for non-cybernetic, pluralistic control, which is also referred to as collibration in 
political science (Dunsire, 1990).  
According to Hood and Jones (1996), for example, the following techniques help managers in their 
efforts to control conflicting agendas: 
 Encouraging explicit institutionalization of rival agendas – with institutionalized champions 
for each of the rival agendas.  
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 Organizing around values rather than functionalized responsibilities.  
 Developing incentive structures which reward confrontation and encourage value champions 
to take extreme positions, and staging regular, but not continuous adversarial exchanges.  
 Ensuring second chances for failures – mechanisms for wiping the slate clean, so that neither 
party lose clout or credibility and the adversarial viewpoints can be brought into exchange 
again.  
These techniques are applicable in control situations where control cannot be predicated on a 
general and stable consensus on goals. The solution, Hood and Jones argue, is a periodically changing 
equilibrium brought about by equal pressure coming from the opposing forces, and a balance-tipping 
process. In sum, when neither objectives, nor measures are clear, managers have to “collibrate”, that 
is, they regularly (but not constantly) need to bring opposing forces into dialogue with one another.  
In addition, management control researchers have been exploring how particular tools and 
technologies, such as costing and performance measurement systems, are involved in ongoing 
contests and struggles as various organizational groups further particular interests and values 
(Nahapiet, 1988; Briers & Chua, 2001; Andon, Baxter and Chua, 2007; Chenhall, Hall and Smith, 2013). 
Chenhall, Hall and Smith (2013) develop the concept of compromising accounts to describe the role 
that accounting tools and technologies (such as performance measurement systems) can play in 
facilitating the requisite (if temporary) compromises that enable heterarchies to function. Their field 
study of a non-governmental organization highlighted very real tensions among various interests, 
which were exacerbated by limited resources (in terms of money, time and space) and in that sense, 
strongly echoes the pressures present in the Kursk rescue mission.  Their case describes a hierarchy in 
action, with episodes of both productive and unproductive discussions – some leading to 
compromise and action, others ending in ‘breakdown’. What made the difference was the design of 
the accounting tool implicated in the control process. Chenhall, Hall and Smith also illuminate some 
of the design characteristics of accounts that can productively manage tensions between multiple 
evaluative principles. First, such designs involve ‘imperfection’, that is, a process of ‘give and take’ 
that ensures that no single evaluative principle comes to dominate others (Chenhall, Hall and Smith, 
2013: 269). This is in line with Hood and Jones (1992)’ argument for ensuring second chances for 
failures, but clarifies what kind of mechanism can achieve that – certain kinds of accounting practices 
that make visible (however inaccurately) what’s important to different organizational actors. The 
resulting “concurrent visibility” serves to enable productive discussions and eventual compromises. 
Chenhall, Hall and Smith further caution that debates over the mechanics of accounting practices can 
be unproductive, whereas debate focused on the principles underlying each account can help 
integrate the various evaluative principles at play. 
The above set of techniques and conditions (deliberate, tolerated ‘imperfection’; concurrent 
visibility; debates focusing on principles, not mechanics) are by no means complete – in line with 
Chenhall, Hall and Smith (2013), we call for further research to examine what tools, processes and 
structural arrangements can bring together (or indeed push apart) organizational groups with 
different evaluative principles.  
Our analysis of the failure of the Kursk rescue mission highlighted another condition (not 
mentioned in the above literatures) that seems critical in pluralistic risk management: a wide span of 
support, predicated on trust, equity and group identification among the actors.   
Future research in risk and disaster management can usefully explore organizational structures 
that can resolve evaluative dissonance, if only temporarily, and processes that enable repeat- 
resolutions to take place. Incorporating relevant insights on pluralistic control, collaborative 
heterarchies and collibration into the risk-management domain will thus provide us with the 
necessary foundations for pluralistic risk management – a new risk-management approach that would 
be suited to settings characterized by ongoing ambiguity among coexisting principles. 
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Exhibit 1 The Kursk’s Position and Interior Following the Explosions 
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Exhibit 2 Timeline and summary of key events 
Saturday August 12, 2000 
o Twin explosions sink the Kursk at 11:30 during a naval exercise. Twenty‐three survivors gather in the ninth, 
rearmost compartment of the submarine. 
o At 23:30, the Northern Fleet raises alarm; Russian search and rescue services (SRS) mobilize. 
Sunday August 13, 2000 
o Russian forces identify the Kursk’s location datum; the submersible Priz attempts to dock with the Kursk but 
is unable to latch onto the sunken submarine before battery power runs out. 
Monday August 14, 2000 
o Admiral Skorgen, suspecting offers assistance to Admiral Popov via direct military phone line.  
o Russian television announces to the public that the Kursk had sunk in the Barents Sea. 
o Commodore Russell begins contingency planning for UKSRS to aid in rescue efforts.  
o The Norwegian and British governments formally extend offers of assistance with the rescue. 
Tuesday August 15, 2000 
o In Moscow, senior Russian officials debate whether to accept the Western offers of assistance. 
o Hazardous weather force Russian SRS (led by Admiral Verich) to temporarily suspend rescue operations. 
o Igor Baranov, the construction director of the Kursk, speaks at a press conference and estimates that the 
Kursk sailors could survive “five or possibly six more days.” 
Wednesday August 16, 2000 
o Admiral Popov officially accepts the Norwegian offer of assistance and requests deep‐sea divers. 
o Russian senior naval officials, through NATO, accept the British offer of assistance.  
o Commodore Russell, having already made preliminary plans, begins transport via Royal Air Force to Russian 
Northern Fleet headquarters in Murmansk. The RAF plane is denied entry to Russian airspace and Russell is 
forced to disembark in Norway.  
Thursday August 17, 2000 
o Russian SRS—now with its best submersible pilots on hand—resumes rescue efforts. 
o The Normand Pioneer, bearing the LR5 and the rest of UKSRS, sails from Trondheim.  
Friday August 18, 2000 
o Russell joins the Normand Pioneer via Norwegian army helicopter transfer. 
Saturday August 19, 2000 
o The Normand Pioneer and Seaway Eagle take position 14 nautical miles from the Kursk site. 
o UK, Norwegian, and Russian commanders meet for the first time aboard the Seaway Eagle, where Admiral 
Verich refuses use of the LR5.  
o Later in the day, Admiral Burtsev visits Russell onboard the Normand Pioneer and contradicts Admiral Verich 
by urging UKSRS to begin operations and by promising to bring requested Russian personnel. 
Sunday August 20, 2000 
o The Seaway Eagle is ordered by the Russians to move to the Kursk location, while the Normand Pioneer is 
requested to remain away. 
o Norwegian divers survey the site and inspect the Kursk. The divers report that the hatch appears 
undamaged and recommend that the LR5 be deployed to attempt rescue. 
Monday August 21, 2000   
o The Normand Pioneer is finally ordered to approach the Kursk site. But before LR5 can be deployed, divers 
confirm that the compartment has been flooded. There are no survivors. 
 Tuesday August 22, 2000 
o Commodore Russell is invited aboard the Russian flagship Peter the Great. 
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Exhibit 3 Command and Control Arrangements of the International Rescue Mission 
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